[…] Artillery and rocket fire were exchanged. The fighting ended with the signing of a ceasefire agreement brokered by Russia in November […] We instruct our mediators to present to the Presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan an updated version of the Madrid document of November 2007, which will be the last articulation of the basic principles. We urge the Armenian and Azerbaijani presidents to resolve the few remaining differences between them and to conclude their agreement on these fundamental principles, which will lead to a comprehensive settlement. Moreover, I cannot help but think that resistance to Madrid`s principles, with the exception of the ARF-D for obvious reasons, within the ANC of Ter Petrossian, is not only part of the politicized environment since 2008 and is simply an attempt to exploit Karabakh to push for regime change. I say this because the 1997 proposals clearly did not have a status determination mechanism. In fact, says Gerard Libaridian, Ter-Petrossian was ready to accept autonomy in Azerbaijan, and it was Kocharian, Serge and Vazgen Sargsyan who, along with the Armenians of Karabakh, refused. — Armenian President Levon Ter-Petrosian had revised his approach to the Karabakh problem since he was head of the Karabakh Committee in 1988, when he was in favour of reunification with Armenia. Under his presidency, the Armenian government`s approach was to define the issue as the security of Nagorno-Karabakh and its right to self-determination – not necessarily the unpopular international goals of independence or reunification with Armenia. Ter-Petrosian sought to find a compromise in which the Armenian side recognized that Nagorno-Karabakh would be legally part of Azerbaijan; In return, Azerbaijan would accept a status greater than the nominal autonomy that the NKAO had enjoyed until 1988, but a gash below independence. www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/nagorny-karabakh/elusive-right-formula.php — I also do not find it unfair to criticize the discourse on the participation of the Azerbaijani minority of NK, which was and remains a minority. The same applies to no-fly zones and demilitarized zones around Karabakh. I think it makes sense to bear in mind that these elements would be part of all the security guarantees, as well as the sending of peacekeeping forces to those areas.

Unfortunately, I think Karabakh has become a means of coming to power or maintaining it. Ter-Petrossian became president on the back of the Karabakh movement, losing power, Kocharian took his place and manipulated the conflict for internal needs, and now the opposition is also hoping to fuel fears of a „sell-off“ for the same purpose. Meanwhile, Aliyev`s war rhetoric is also used for domestic consumption.