Section 17 provides that the dispute settlement agreement applies to disputes under the AD agreement. However, Article 17.6 establishes a specific standard of verification that must be applied by the authorities in the review of disputes in anti-dumping cases, both with respect to the facts and the issues of interpretation of the agreement. This standard honours the actual legal decisions and interpretations of national authorities and aims to prevent dispute resolution bodies from making decisions on their own opinions. A ministerial decision that is not part of the AD agreement provides that its activities will be reviewed after three years to ensure that it is generally appropriate. Article 1 of the AD Agreement establishes the fundamental principle that a member cannot impose an anti-dumping measure unless he finds, as a result of an investigation conducted pursuant to the provisions of the AD agreement, that there are dumping imports, significant harm to a domestic industry and a causal link between dumped imports and prejudice. As a general rule, anti-dumping duties are instituted on all imports of manufactured goods manufactured on or after the date of provisional finding of dumping, harm and causation. After verification, a year later, the United States announced that it would introduce a total of 522% combined anti-dumping and countervailing duties on certain steels imported from China. In 2018, China filed a complaint with the WTO, outspoing tariffs imposed by the Trump administration. Since then, the Trump administration has continued to use the WTO to challenge trade practices it claims to have used by the Chinese government and other trading partners. The World Trade Organization (WTO), commonly known as the AD Agreement, regulates the application of anti-dumping measures by WTO member states. Article 10 establishes the general principle that both provisional and final anti-dumping duties can only be applied from the date on which the findings of dumping, prejudice and causation were established. In recognizing that the harm may have occurred during the investigation period or that exporters may have taken steps to prevent the establishment of an anti-dumping duty, Article 10 contains provisions relating to the retroactive institution of dumping duties in certain circumstances. If the institution of anti-dumping duties is based on the finding of material damage, as opposed to the threat of material harm or a significant delay in establishing a domestic industry, anti-dumping duties may be levied from the date of provisional measures being taken.

Where interim duties in excess of the final tariff have been collected or the collection of these duties is based on the finding of imminent material harm or significant delay, a refund of the interim duties is required. Article 10.6 provides for the retroactive application of final tariffs to a date of 90 days at the latest before the application of the interim measures, in certain exceptional circumstances, involving a history of dumping, imports subject to massive dumping and a possible violation of the corrective measures of the final duty. The World Trade Organization (WTO) is an international organization that deals with the rules of trade between nations. The WTO also enforces a number of international trade rules, including international anti-dumping regulations. The WTO does not interfere in the activities of dumping companies. Instead, it focuses on how governments can or cannot respond to the practice of dumping. In general, the WTO agreement allows governments to combat dumping “if it causes or threatens to cause significant harm to a historic sector on the territory of a contracting party or if it significantly delays the creation of a domestic industry.” In many cases, the tariffs levied on these products exceed the value of goods.